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THE R.G. DUN & COMPANY COLLECTION,1 has been described as a “treasure
trove of information”,2 as well as “a relatively unique but unfortunately little-used
source for the exploration of Canadian Urban History”.3 Both descriptions are
accurate, for the records provide rare insights into mid-19th-century North American
business communities while being quite different from the sources historians have
traditionally depended upon. Furthermore, the collection has yet to attract the
attention it warrants from academics, especially in Canada.4 This research note seeks
to renew the call for more scholarly interest in these records by extending that call to
social, ethnic, economic, business and women’s historians and by exploring what all
of these practitioners may glean from the records about mid-19th-century
Newfoundland.
The records’ provenance, the reasons they exist at all, have determined their nature
and, to a large extent, their content. R.G. Dun & Co. began as the Mercantile Agency,
created in 1841 as a result of the failure of Arthur Tappan & Co. of New York,
wholesale and retail silk dealers. Tappan’s company had gone out of business due to
the failure of some of the firm’s customers. This was an occurrence all too common
during a period when the collapse of one or a few businesses could lead to financial
troubles throughout the business community in which they dealt, often resulting in the
1 The Collection is held at the Baker Library of the Harvard Graduate School of Business
Administration. Portions of the collection are now available on microfilm at the National Archives of
Canada. The research for and the writing of this research note were undertaken with the support of
the Smallwood Centre for Newfoundland Studies and the Institute for Social and Economic Research,
both of Memorial University of Newfoundland.
2 Michael Katz, “The Entrepreneurial Class in a Canadian City: The Mid-Nineteenth Century”, Journal
of Social History, 8 (Winter 1975), p. 9.
3 D.A. Muise, “The Dun and Bradstreet Collection: A Report”, Urban History Review, 3-75 (1976), p.
23. Muise refers to the collection as the Dun and Bradstreet records although the two credit agencies,
R.G. Dun & Co. and John M. Bradstreet & Son, did not actually merge until the 1930s. On a recent
visit to Baker Library, I was advised to refer to the records as those of R.G. Dun & Co., the firm
responsible for creating the credit ledgers that make up the collection. When Muise wrote his report,
he was aware of only one Canadian scholar to have used the collection, that being Michael Katz in
his article on the Hamilton business community published that same year, despite the records having
been available since 1968.
4 Since Katz, a small number of Canadian scholars have used the Dun records, among them historians
Gerald Tulchinsky and Henry C. Klassen in studies respectively of the Montreal Jewish and Albertan
business communities.
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failure of their creditors. In an attempt to avoid similar disasters in future, Arthur
Tappan, with his brother and partner Lewis, began accumulating information on
buyers throughout the United States, in the hope of gaining reliable reports on their
credit status. When they began fielding numerous requests for information from
fellow suppliers, Lewis Tappan established the Mercantile Agency, which became
R.G. Dun & Co. in 1859.5
The changing nature of the market had necessitated the creation of a reliable source
of information about the worth and stability of businesses. The growing distance and
anonymity of the markets meant dealing with firms that were unknown entities. While
letters of recommendation had, for a time, served the purpose of introducing a
potential customer to a supplier, they could not provide the information many dealers
required before extending credit; nor did the letters give regular updates as to the
changing financial status of a firm’s customers. The Mercantile Agency responded to
this need by contracting correspondents in cities and towns throughout the United
States, and later in Canada and Europe, to report regularly on the financial worth and
credit ratings of the firms in their community. The information gathered was then
transferred to ledgers at the firm’s head offices where it was available to answer
inquiries about particular businesses. Eventually, the information would be published
in books of commercial ratings, making it easily accessible to the agency’s
customers.6
The kind of information that correspondents were requested to gather on local
firms and businessmen, and much more rarely on businesswomen, included the type
of business, age of the business, value of the business, and the owners’ character,
business ability, wealth, property, real estate, debts and mortgages.7 The agency’s
correspondents were generally lawyers, sometimes bankers or public officials, who
were not connected to the merchants they reported on but who knew the people and
the firms in their community. Later, the company would send out travelling agents to
verify the reports sent in by correspondents with the aim of improving the accuracy
and reliability of the information collected.8
The reports contained in the R.G. Dun & Co. credit ledgers represented attempts to
quantify a business’s creditworthiness by using largely qualitative information. The
credit ratings given to businesses were based, for the most part, on descriptions of a
person’s character, which in turn were dependent upon rumour and innuendo, often
erroneously, as revealed by the frequency with which details in the reports — even
information as basic as the owner’s first name or approximate age — conflicted.
5 Edward N. Vose, Seventy-Five Years of The Mercantile Agency R.G. Dun & Co. 1841-1916
(Brooklyn, 1916), pp. 15-16 and James D. Norris, R.G. Dun & Co., 1841-1900: The Development of
Credit-Reporting in the Nineteenth Century (Westport, Conn., 1978), pp. 16-19.
6 Vose, The Mercantile Agency, pp. 4-5, 20, 59. These books are important historical sources in their
own right, although lending themselves more to statistical rather than to contextual analysis, as
illustrated by historical geographer Larry McCann in an article which traced the advance of
metropolitan control of Maritime business, using the books to examine the shift from local ownership
of business to the dominance of Central Canadian and American branch businesses in the Maritimes.
See L.D. McCann, “Metropolitanism and Branch Business in the Maritimes, 1881-1931”, Acadiensis,
XIII, 1 (Autumn 1983), pp. 112-25.
7 Vose, The Mercantile Agency, p. 66.
8 Vose, The Mercantile Agency, pp. 66 and Norris, R.G. Dun & Co., pp. 20-2.
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Correspondents were expected to provide accurate statistics on the worth of the
business and the value of property owned, but such figures were not always available
as local correspondents were to remain anonymous and could not personally request
the information they sought. Businesses would later be encouraged to provide
financial statements to ensure that reports were accurate, but during much of the
period covered in the credit ledgers Dun correspondents still depended primarily on
what amounted to hearsay. Reports contained in the Newfoundland credit ledger
illustrate the problem of gaining financial information, as correspondents were forced
to give broad estimations of a firm’s value or the owner’s wealth, often admitting that
they had no idea if the person owned any property at all. Limitations on the
accessibility and accuracy of the information local correspondents forwarded to the
agency perhaps explains the inadequate predictive ability of the reports regarding the
future success or failure of a business. All too frequently in the reports, businesses
considered to be infallible suddenly failed, and businessmen deemed to be above
reproach proved susceptible to dishonesty.
Although the period covered by some of the ledgers in the collection runs from
1842 to about 1885,9 reports in the Newfoundland credit ledger span only the 19 years
from 1855 to 1874. This is still a sufficient period of time to allow for some
conclusions regarding the local business community. While the intention of the
agency had been to gather new reports every six months to ensure that up-to-date
information was available, the entries for most Newfoundland businesses were
generally spaced two to three years apart, unless something particularly noteworthy,
such as a failure, had occurred in the interim. This is, apparently, the case for most of
the credit ledgers in the collection. Despite this, D.A. Muise has noted, “the reporting
was often regular enough to give a realistic picture of the prosperity of given
businesses”.10 It is also sufficient to allow us to trace different elements in the
development of a business community as well as economic trends.
It should be pointed out that in the Newfoundland credit ledger the vast majority
of businesses reported on were those involved in international trade, particularly in the
American market, and thus were primarily large firms located in St. John’s.
Consequently, the reports contained in the ledger deal only with a portion of the city’s
business community, most of them businessmen who would have felt quite at home
among their contemporaries in Michael Katz’s business class in Hamilton.11 Like the
men Katz studied, they were prominent businessmen, influential in the island’s
political, economic and social spheres. At the same time, however, they represented a
significant portion of the St. John’s business community, for of the 957 listings in an
1864 city business directory, 378 appeared in the Dun credit ledger.12 Although some
of the firms are listed several times under different headings in the directory and in
9 Muise, “Dun and Bradstreet”, p. 24.
10 Muise, “Dun and Bradstreet”, p. 25.
11 Using the Dun records in addition to sources such as newspapers, Katz identified a representative
number of men from Hamilton’s business class which dominated the city’s political and economic life
in the 19th century. Due to their large and extensive business interests, many members of the class
were reported in the Dun credit ledger for that city. See Michael Katz, Michael Doucet and Mark
Stern, The Social Organization of Early Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), p. 25.
12 Hutchinson’s Newfoundland Directory for 1864-1865 (St. John’s, 1864), pp. 224-36.
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the ledger that year, it does indicate that, while not representative of the St. John’s
business community, the ledger’s reports do represent a significant portion of it.
To indicate the nature of the entries, it is worth quoting a typical business report,
such as that given for the St. John’s firm P. & L. Tessier, merchants:
Oct 22/55 Commenc[e]d bus[iness] in ‘48 & at that time w[orth] about
£4000. ‘Peter’ was for a n[umber] of y[ear]s with ‘R. Alsop Co.’ & well
acquainted with trade. ‘Lewis’ was also a n[umber] of y[ear]s engaged in one
of our first houses. Both are active, indus[trious] men, g[oo]d char[acter] &
st[an]d[in]g. Until the past y[ea]r were d[oin]g a v[er]y l[ar]ge shipp[in]g
trade but now engag[e]d as Com[missio]n Merch[an]ts & gen[era]l Brokers.
Have made cons[idera]bl[e] money but lost a l[ar]ge am[oun]t in ‘54. Do not
know of th[ei]r owning any R[eal] E[state] but are in g[oo]d cr[edit] & v[er]y
much respect[e]d in the trade. Cannot say wh[a]t they are now w[orth] . . . .
Mar 23/58 Hon[orable] men w[orth] ab[ou]t £8000, are doing a middling
safe bus[iness], have lost consid[erable] during the last y[ea]r. I still consider
them g[oo]d . . . . Aug 25/58 Do a fair bus[iness]. Import considerable from
U.S. In bus[iness] some 10 or 12 y[ear]s. Middle aged men, one married,
char[acter] good. ‘L.T.’ drinks a little but is the best bus[iness] man, good
capacity, cap[ita]l all in bus[iness], business rather extended for m[ea]ns,
cr[edit] very fair. Honorable men, had to ask time last fall but show[e]d a
satisfactory statement, own part of their bus[iness] premises in leasehold
ground. . . . Jany 31/59 No ch[an]g[e]. . . . May 10/60 Same as former report.
They are equally responsible as to means. . . . Sept 1/60 Rather extended. . . .
March /61 Continue to hold the same position & credit. . . . Oct 15/61 In
bus[iness] 15 y[ea]rs, overtraded 6 y[ea]rs ago & got extensions. H[a]v[e]
been successful past 2 y[ea]rs, fully recovered. Are g[oo]d bus[iness] men,
ages 40 & 45, sharp & atten[tive], char[acter] & hab[it]s g[oo]d. Made over
£4000 2 y[ea]rs ago in shipments to Brazil, are w[orth] £15 or £20,000,
g[oo]d cr[edit] for eng[age]m[en]ts . . . . July 29/62 No change. . . . Jan 26/63
No ch[an]ge. . . . Dec /63 Are m[a]k[in]g money & d[oin]g well. . . . July
18/65 Doing a g[oo]d bus[iness], have suffered in common with others from
gen[era]l depression but th[in]k in g[oo]d position & safe, w[orth] 50 to
100,000$. . . . Dec 26/65 Doing well.13
This example illustrates many features of the reports found in the Newfoundland
credit ledger. Rarely were businesses reported on more than once a year, and
sometimes less often. The reports usually discussed the character, ability and social
standing of the businessperson in question, as well as his/her means, property and
whatever was known of the business’s history. All of these aspects were considered
in determining a credit rating, but some were more important than others, particularly
means and real estate, the best indications of whether a debt would likely be repaid.
Ability or business capacity, usually estimated as poor, fair, middling or good, was
13 “Newfoundland”, Vol. 10, p. 16, R.G. Dun & Co. Collection, Baker Library, Harvard University
Graduate School of Business Administration. This volume is cited below as R.G. Dun.
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considered an indicator of future prospects, whether the business was likely to survive
and prosper. Character descriptions, of secondary importance in determining a credit
rating, were meant to suggest whether a person was honest and reliable in business
dealings; common adjectives included terms such as honorable, respected, upstanding
and straightforward, or alternatively, dishonest, slovenly, inattentive and dissipated.
Dun reporters were more likely to overlook deficiencies in character if a person’s
wealth was sufficient to compensate for limited ability or questionable ethics.
Although being respected and popular certainly increased one’s chances of being
deemed a good credit risk, a person was rarely recommended solely on that basis.
St. John’s merchant David Steele was deemed “of good character and business
qualifications” on account of his father, a “very wealthy” and “celebrated shipbuilder”
in Greenock, Scotland, and as well because he had been apprenticed, or “brought up”,
in “one of the [first] houses in the city” of St. John’s. Despite the Dun reporter’s
endorsement, not three years later Steele had failed for £85,000. The failure was
deemed dishonest, being described as a “bad case” with Steele having gone “home by
next steamer”.14 Clearly, Steele’s acceptability as a good credit risk was based largely
on his father’s wealth and reputation as well as his connection to an important St.
John’s firm, and not on any concrete knowledge of his personal ability, means or
honesty. Conversely, one C. Dennehy, a local tailor, who was described as “a sober,
hardworking man, worth little or nothing” in 1858, was dismissed as “not worthy of
further note” in 1866 despite the fact that, although he had faced many hardships, not
least of them a fire, his business had never failed.15 Although Dennehy’s personal
traits were considered admirable enough, unlike Steele he lacked the means and
connections necessary to be recommended for credit by the Dun agency.
While a firm’s worth and the owner’s personal means, property and connections
were of primary importance to R.G. Dun & Co., character was also taken into account,
especially if a person had a business failure in the past. If one was respected and
considered to have dealt honorably with creditors in a past compromise, Dun
reporters, and the business community as a whole, were willing to allow a second
chance and, in extreme cases, a third or fourth chance to start over, although it could
be some years before one was recommended for credit without caution.16
If a failure was considered questionable or dishonest, it could lead to something
akin to banishment or exile from the business community, as in the case of David
Steele, or the dry goods merchant Neil McDougall, who was considered a good and
popular businessman until he failed in 1860, the Dun report implying his troubles
were due to dissipation and inattentiveness to business.17 Both left the country soon
after their failures, a common scenario in reports of failures attributed to dishonesty
or personal failing, indicating that many considered starting over elsewhere a better
option than remaining on the island. Thomas Malloy, a petty auction and commission
merchant, also left Newfoundland under “discreditable circumstances” but chose to
return a few years later and was then reported as occupying a “small shed in Water
14 R.G. Dun, p. 16.
15 R.G. Dun, p. 70.
16 R.G. Dun, pp. 19, 22.
17 R.G. Dun, pp. 16, 22.
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Street containing a few barrels flour”. Not surprisingly, the Dun agent declined to
recommend him for credit in consequence of his having “failed and r[u]n away”.18 In
extreme cases, bad failures actually resulted in arrest, bankruptcy court and
imprisonment.19
Just as the agency’s reports were often vague or inaccurate about a business’s
financial statistics, Dun reporters in St. John’s were often wrong about the people they
reported on, no doubt due to the fact that much of their information came from local
gossip. There existed a code of honour accounting for the emphasis on character in the
reports, particularly on a businessperson being honorable and honest, two of the most
frequently used terms in the reports. As Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall have
argued in the case of 19th-century English businessmen, “the personality of the
entrepreneur, or partners, was the firm” and “firms tended to be judged on the quality
of their partners, a judgement frequently given moral, even religious overtones”.20
Dun clients were often cautioned against doing business with men the reporter
considered of questionable honour. When supposedly honest men were revealed to
have cheated or dealt dishonorably with creditors, there is a sense in the reports that
the reporters felt personally deceived, an ironic outcome considering that the purpose
of preparing such reports was so that clients could avoid having to trust solely in a
customer’s honour. When recommending a business for credit, Dun reporters to a
large extent were trusting their impressions of the owner’s honour. This is best
illustrated by the case of J.B. Barnes & Co., merchants involved in the West India
trade and longtime members of the St. John’s business community. J.B. Barnes and
W. Ebenezer, partners in the firm, were described as “fine busi[ness]men [and] of
excellent char[acter]” in 1855 and, despite a failure in 1858, were back in business
three years later. They were still considered of “g[oo]d char[acter] and hab[it]s” as
well as honest, despite having been “unfortunate” in business. Only four years later,
Barnes and Ebenezer had failed again, this time having “got rid of all assets by
financial scheming [and] ha[ving] not a penny with wh[ich] to pay £10,000”. The
report of their latest failure and dishonesty ends with the epithet “Scamps”, its tone
suggesting a deep disillusionment on the part of the reporter and the business
community that had supported and trusted them.21
While honesty and integrity were clearly valued characteristics of a respected
businessperson, Dun reporters in St. John’s were willing to overlook personal
idiosyncrasies or failings if they were not considered harmful to business. The records
often refer to the drinking habits of a businessman, but if he drinks only occasionally
or if there is another partner capable of taking up the slack when his partner “gets
light”, it did not appear to affect the firm’s standing adversely. This was the case for
L. Tessier of P. & L. Tessier, J.B. Wood of Clift, Wood & Co., auctioneers and
commission merchants (who drank and did not “attend much to bus[iness]”) and it
was the same for Shaw of Elmsley, Shaw & Thomson, grocers and dry goods
18 R.G. Dun, p. 71.
19 R.G. Dun, pp. 38, 64, 78.
20 Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle
Class, 1780-1850 (Chicago, 1987), pp. 200-1.
21 R.G. Dun, p. 24.
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merchants, whose “mind ha[d] been affected from drink . . . [and was] never likely to
be g[oo]d for much”. These men were fortunate that they had partners who were “steady
and v[er]y atten[tive]” and ensured their businesses were “well look[e]d after”.22
However, if such habits were thought to be detrimental to business, credit ratings
tended to reflect the reporter’s concern and disapproval, indicative of widely-held
middle-class notions of morality.23 Although Duncan Weir, a grocer, was considered
a man of good character and habits as well as a good businessman with accordingly
good credit in 1858, his business soon began to suffer as a result of his “dissipated
hab[it]s”. By 1863, he was deemed “unworthy of cr[edit] owing to bad habits” — with
apparent just cause, for in 1865 it was reported that the firm had “Gone down” and
was “Out of bus[iness]”.24 Similar reports were made on Thomas Murray, a clothier,
and Richard Hamlin, a grocer and cabinetmaker, whose businesses were “going down
fast from drinking” and were “not safe”.25
Almost invariably mentioned in the credit reports was a person’s marital status.
Most of the businessmen, being middle-aged and older, were married, while the few
businesswomen reported were, without exception, single or widowed. Presumably,
being married was considered an indication of one’s maturity and stability but only in
the case of men, for married women would, as a rule, not be found operating an
independent business. Being a young, unmarried businessman was not necessarily
cause for concern, however, unless one clung too long to single status, as did Brace
of Dick & Brace, booksellers, who was described as a “confirmed and deformed
bachelor”.26
Drinking and womanizing were not the only concerns creditors had about the
personal lives of their clients, however, as Dun reports also mention cases of mental
instability. It took several years for Daniel Green, a shipowner based in Harbour
Grace, at one time considered a good credit risk, to overcome the damage caused to
his credit rating by his “mental derangement” and subsequent stay in the “Lunatic
Asylum”. Although he was thought to have recovered and to be doing well, reports of
his being “subject to attacks of insanity and cut[ting] up strange, freak[ing] out
occasionally”, cast doubt on his desirability as a customer, even though he was also
termed a “well meaning man”. After several years and a good seal fishery, Green was
worth “lots of money” and considered sane, the implication being that he was, once
more, a fair credit risk for Dun clients.27 Thomas Godden, a merchant also of Harbour
Grace and “subject to aberration of mind”, was not so fortunate. Because rumours
conflicted over the stability of his business, not to mention his mind, it was decided
that he should not be “called unsafe”, but this was hardly a statement likely to inspire
faith in prospective creditors. Less than a year later, it was stated outright that he was
no longer “desirable for credit”. It would appear that Godden’s negative assessment
22 R.G. Dun, pp. 16, 18, 60.
23 According to Davidoff and Hall, Family Fortunes, p. 400, “drunkenness in the middle ranks had
fallen off markedly by the 1840s, further distinguishing them from the loutishness of those below and
debauchery above”.
24 R.G. Dun, p. 60.
25 R.G. Dun, pp. 61, 62.
26 R.G. Dun, p. 72.
27 R.G. Dun, p. 53.
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was more a consequence of his limited means than his mental history, but that Green’s
wealth was largely responsible for the improved rating in his case.28
While drink and dissipation, to Dun reporters, were among the more troubling
character traits in a businessman, the agency also had its doubts about those involved
in activities thought to be “speculative”. Mining was considered to be highly
speculative and cause for much concern to prospective creditors. St. John’s merchant
C.F. Bennett, said to be “the [first] per[son] here to take hold of any new enterprise”,
had invested considerably in copper mining. The Dun reporter admitted this had “so
far been a success” but it was still “looked upon as a speculation”. Bennett also owned
a brewery, distillery, foundry and more than a million acres of land in addition to his
mercantile firm, real estate and floating property. Because of his wealth, there was
little concern that he would not be good for his engagements, yet the fact that he had
“made favorable arrang[e]m[en]ts in the Terra Nova Mine by leasing his cut” and
therefore ran “no risks”, was considered important. The agency was willing to
overlook Bennett’s speculative activities because his investments were separate from
the mercantile firm and he possessed sufficient personal resources to cover any
losses.29 Generally, investing time or money in almost any project outside one’s
business, or expanding into a new trade in which one was not well-versed, was
considered a questionable practice. Such activities might be overlooked in a
businessman with sufficient means to support a loss, but in firms with little capital,
speculation generally resulted in a lower credit rating.
A close relative of the “speculator” was the “visionary”, the main difference being
that visionaries restricted themselves to speculations within their line of business.30
Unfortunately, when attempts to expand operations and increase profits failed, credit
ratings could be adversely affected. James Rogerson, of Peter Rogerson & Son, was
said to be
rather visionary, ha[d] lost largely, struggled hard but been v[er]y
unfortunate. Might h[a]v[e] made £10,000 on seals in ‘57 had they sold the
fat but manufactured it [and] lost nearly all [and] h[a]v[e] lost money since.
Of g[oo]d char[acter] [and] hab[it]s, v[er]y prud[en]t [and] worthy but has
trouble in buying here. His paper w[oul]d not be taken for £100. Means if
any quite small [and] not desirable for cr[edit] abroad. . . . Striving [and]
indus[trious] but unfortunate [and] as before is with difficulty credited.
Hon[orable] as the Sun but v[er]y little financial respons[ibilit]y.31
Although the next few years were difficult ones for Rogerson, due largely to his
troubles in the seal fishery, by 1869 he had managed to clear his losses and had the
support of a Harbour Grace firm, Punton & Munn, who had given him “a high
character” in a letter of recommendation. After nearly 15 years of financial difficulties
and bad credit resulting in part from attempts to expand into the secondary processing
28 R.G. Dun, p. 54.
29 R.G. Dun, pp. 16, 79.
30 R.G. Dun, pp. 16, 17, 26, 39, 60, 79.
31 R.G. Dun, p. 17.
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of their seal catch, the Rogerson firm was once more deemed to be in good credit.32
The Dun reporter’s assessment of Rogerson’s troubles was perhaps indicative of
the problems facing Newfoundland’s sealing industry during the period and illustrates
how the records may be used to trace economic trends. While there had been a great
demand in England for fish oils to light lamps and for lubricants in machinery,
imports fell throughout much of the 19th century, particularly with the introduction of
gas lamps and, later, electricity. These problems were exacerbated in the late 1850s
and early 1860s by a low seal catch. Although the price of seal oil continued to drop
throughout the 1860s, exports rose in the later part of the decade. These trends help
explain Rogerson’s early troubles and improved fortunes by 1870.33
The Hamilton credit ledger reveals a very different attitude towards speculation
from that of the Newfoundland business community. Katz has argued that “Given the
limited investment opportunities of the time land occupied the place that the stock
market someday would assume” and that, in the Hamilton business class, “gambling
with land, done with a touch of restraint and good sense, was no vice in the eyes of
men who gave credit. Quite the contrary; it meant a man was enterprising”. In fact, as
Katz later wrote, “No matter what the nature of a man’s business he was expected to
play the land market”.34 In the St. John’s Dun reports, owning real estate was also
considered an important factor in establishing good credit but it was generally
restricted to owning one’s business premises, home, some floating property and
perhaps a farm or country retreat. It was not considered speculation. The conservative
nature of the St. John’s business community with regard to investment may be
attributable to the even fewer opportunities for speculation in Newfoundland (many
of the businessmen Katz studied had invested significantly in the railroad)35 or to an
even shakier economic environment than that of Hamilton due to heavy investment in
an unpredictable fishery. Because a particularly good fishery could be followed by
several bad ones, it was not considered wise to spread resources too far afield,
especially by investing in trades or industries in which one had little experience or
past success.
Like many of the members of Hamilton’s business class, a significant number of
the St. John’s businessmen mentioned in the credit ledger were involved in public life,
often as members of the House of Assembly or Legislative Council, or sometimes as
consuls to a foreign country.36 Although such activities suggested a person was
popular and influential in the community, they rarely contributed to a better rating, for
32 R.G. Dun, p. 17.
33 Shannon Ryan, The Ice Hunters: A History of Newfoundland Sealing to 1914 (St. John’s, 1994), pp.
79-84, 105.
34 Katz, “The Entrepreneurial Class”, pp. 12-13 and Katz, Doucet and Stern, Early Industrial
Capitalism, p. 30.
35 Katz, Doucet and Stern, Early Industrial Capitalism, p. 26. Although local businessmen at this time
did not have the Newfoundland railroad to invest in, the “most influential merchants” were investors
in the St. John’s gas and water companies. The ledger also mentions the New York, London and
Newfoundland Telegraph Company but suggests that very little stock was held locally. R.G. Dun, pp.
45-6.
36 R.G. Dun, pp. 16, 26, 27, 28, 33, 44, 49, 53, 58, 59, 67, 71; Katz, Doucet and Stern, Early Industrial
Capitalism, pp. 26-7.
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it meant spending time away from business. Robert Allen, co-owner in an iron
foundry with his brother Thomas, was described as “a city alderman which is a poor
paying speculation” and was blamed for the business’s lack of growth as “too much
time [wa]s given to municipal affairs”.37 On the other hand, a government
appointment, if accompanied by a salary, was usually considered an asset, for it meant
an income independent of the business.38
While poor businessmen and poor credit risks could be considered dishonest,
dissipated or speculative, what made a good businessman was less easy to pinpoint.
In general, good businessmen were so because they were reputed to be good
businessmen— but also because they were considered to be active, attentive, prudent,
persevering, saving and smart. Katz found in the Hamilton credit reports that, for the
most part, good businessmen were those who were successful, and poor businessmen
were those who were not. In some cases, the reporter’s opinion of a businessman
changed according to his financial fortunes, with estimations of his business ability
and character waning along with his profits.39 Although similar shifts in attitude can
be seen in the Newfoundland reports, this was not as consistently the case as Katz
found in the Hamilton credit records. In the Newfoundland ledger, if a businessman’s
losses were due less to his management than to a poor fishery or a general depression,
this was quickly pointed out and his reputation preserved. Although the firm of
Goodrich & Kellygrews failed to meet their payments and had to call their creditors
together in 1860, it was pointed out that “their losses ar[o]se from the bad fisheries for
the past two years [and] not in any way from mismanagement or extravagance, they
still retain their char[acters] as upright, indus[trious] men of bus[iness]”. Because of
their reputations and their ability to “shew a satisfactory sheet”, their creditors were
willing to give them time to pay their debts.40
The St. John’s business community was, in fact, willing to overlook quite a bit to
help a colleague, often granting extensions or accepting compromises, especially if a
firm’s troubles were considered temporary or the result of a poor year. Still, having to
seek time from creditors was a matter not to be taken lightly and was sufficient cause
for embarrassment. C.F. Bennett & Co., despite the principal partner’s speculative
activities, was a respected firm of commission merchants with extensive operations,
ranging from trade with Spain and Portugal to interests in mining, a foundry and a
brewery. Only a few months after the Dun agency received assurance that the firm
was a good credit risk and that their credit was never questioned, Bennett & Co. were
forced to ask for time from their creditors. According to the report, however, “The
general opinion [wa]s that their Embarrassment was owing to mismanagement [and]
not from want of means [and so]. . . . Time was cheerfully given them”.41 Extensions
were not restricted to prominent businessmen with a degree of wealth, as small
businessmen were also treated leniently by creditors. Like Bennett & Co., P. Knight,
37 R.G. Dun, p. 81.
38 R.G. Dun, pp. 18, 22, 26, 31, 42, 48, 63.
39 Katz, “Entrepreneurial Class”, p. 20.
40 R.G. Dun, p. 56.
41 R.G. Dun, pp. 16, 79.
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who ran a boarding house and a small shop, also found himself overextended and “had
to ask for time” which he “readily got”.42
Such generosity was not entirely selfless and was no doubt motivated in part by the
personal connections linking members of the St. John’s business community as well
as the fear of what one failure could do to the community as a whole. Personal ties
among businessmen were extensive as the community was relatively young and
homogeneous, most of its members being from the West Country of England and the
remainder from Ireland or Scotland, with the odd American or Frenchman also
reported. Those businessmen not directly related by blood were often related by
marriage, many marrying the daughters, sometimes sisters, of local businessmen.
Such interconnections were common among 19th-century middle-class business
families. In England, relatives and friends were frequently also business partners, and
“kinship and friendship often provided the paths along which goods and services
traveled”.43 Marriage served to formalize and strengthen these connections while
helping to ensure that business interests and resources converged to the mutual benefit
of the parties involved.
Another important relationship linking members of the local business community
was that between former employers and their employees. Many St. John’s
businessmen made their start as clerks in local establishments, leaving to set up their
own businesses when they had gained the skills and means to do so, often with the aid
of former employers.44 Some firms were described in the Dun reports as having the
backing or support of an established, well-connected house, a factor which certainly
lent credence to the firms in question, resulting in better credit ratings.45
The credit ledger reveals that kinship ties in the St. John’s business community
were extremely important. While owners changed frequently in firms where the
partners were unrelated, businesses run by a father and his sons or brothers, or an
uncle and his nephews, saw little change unless an elder partner retired or died or a
new partner was admitted. Unrelated partners tended to join or leave a firm to suit
their interests, but partners related by blood or marriage had familial loyalty and
interests to consider.46 Kinship ties were also important in helping a new businessman
establish a good credit rating. A wealthy father, brother or uncle was often mentioned
in Dun reports, even if he was not personally involved with the business, in the belief
that he would lend aid should the need arise.47 Kinship ties could also work against a
firm if the owner’s father had failed, leaving his son to pay his debts, as in the case of
John James, a commission merchant.48 The sons of P. Jordan and Kenneth McLea also
found their fathers to be more of a hindrance than a help when they joined the family
firms; their fathers’ reputations for being unreliable and a drunkard, respectively,
42 R.G. Dun, p. 40.
43 Davidoff and Hall, Family Fortunes, pp. 215, 221.
44 R.G. Dun, pp. 16, 25, 48, 59.
45 R.G. Dun, pp. 17, 30, 32, 33, 35, 38, 47, 54, 59.
46 Katz reported a similar pattern in the Hamilton business community as did Davidoff and Hall among
the English middle class. See Katz, Doucet and Stern, Early Industrial Capitalism, p. 29, and
Davidoff and Hall, Family Fortunes, pp. 215-17.
47 R.G. Dun, pp. 16, 19, 21, 23, 26, 29, 44, 58, 59.
48 R.G. Dun, p. 38.
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created doubts about the firms’ prospects, even though the sons were described as
“active and industrious fellows”.49
When not motivated by sentiment, St. John’s businessmen could often be relied
upon to offer aid out of self-interest, for the failure of one business could have an
impact on the business community as a whole. The Mercantile Agency’s primary
purpose was to avoid the possibility of widespread failures by allowing firms to
consult the company’s ledgers and ratings before doing business with unsafe
customers. The St. John’s business community was particularly vulnerable to the
domino effect because of the extensive professional and familial ties linking its
members.50 The failure of John Hogsett, a commission merchant in St. John’s,
illustrates this point. It contributed to the failure of John Kavannah, a local supplier,
and created financial problems for Hogsett’s other creditors, L. O’Brien, an importer,
and James Brydon, a dry goods merchant, who were fortunately able to absorb their
losses and remain in business.51 Kavannah’s failure, in turn, created problems for one
of his creditors, Thomas Blunden, a merchant tailor, making him an undesirable
customer.52 The mercantile firm of Robert Alsop & Co. was not as fortunate as
O’Brien and Brydon and was unable to withstand their losses “by bad debts in the
supplying trade”.53
The case of Robert Alsop & Co. hints at another problem inherent in doing
business in Newfoundland — the unpredictability of the fishery in a country where
the vast majority of the firms were dependent directly or indirectly on that industry
for profits. The Dun credit ledger for Newfoundland supports Sean Cadigan’s thesis
that the local system of credit was not as exploitative on the part of the merchants as
the traditional interpretation has long suggested, for merchants involved in supplying
the fishery did so at great financial risk.54 While the profits from a good year at the
fishery could be large, the impact of a poor cod or seal fishery could be disastrous, at
times leading to failure. Those firms not directly engaged in supplying the fishery
were also adversely affected by the “general depression” accompanying a poor
fishery. Reporting on the failure of the mercantile firm of Barron Brothers in 1860,
the Dun correspondent was moved to caution: “The trade in this place is in a very
critical state [and] I would recommend great caution in any transactions unless parties
are highly reported”.55
49 R.G. Dun, pp. 30, 54
50 Katz’s description of the economic interdependence of Hamilton’s business class and the country
merchants they supplied, is equally applicable to the St. John’s business community: “The entire
commercial structure resembled a house of cards, fragile and insecure”: Katz, Doucet and Stern,
Early Industrial Capitalism, p. 30. The extent of the community’s insecurity and fragility would be
seen in the disastrous consequences of the Newfoundland bank crash of 1894, caused largely by the
heavy and indiscriminate borrowing practices of St. John’s merchants.
51 R.G. Dun, pp. 27, 30, 58, 62.
52 R.G. Dun, p. 45.
53 R.G. Dun, p. 24.
54 Cadigan has argued that Newfoundland merchants ran the risk of supplying fishermen regardless of
whether or not the price for fish was high or the catch good in a given year and so set prices to help
ensure a return on their investment. Sean Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bay:
Merchant-Settler Relations in Newfoundland, 1755-1855 (Toronto, 1995), pp. 100-1.
55 R.G. Dun, p. 20.
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Consequently, social mobility in the St. John’s business community was often
downward, rather than upward, and even long-established, respected firms were not
immune to downturns in the economy that sometimes ended in failure.56 In 1855 W.
& H. Thomas & Co. was said be one of the finest mercantile establishments in St.
John’s, with the highest credit rating of A No.1, but a change in partners and a bad
fishery forced them to compromise in 1862.57 Robert Rutherford & Brothers, a dry
goods firm, encountered similar problems associated with having to pay out a
partner’s share upon death or retirement while facing a poor year at the fishery. Due
to their reputation as a good, safe business and a long relationship with their creditors
in England, the Rutherfords were able to reach an understanding with creditors,
thereby avoiding the embarrassment of a “compromise in the strict sense of the
term”.58 Another firm, Ridley & Sons, also merchants in St. John’s with an A No. 1
rating, began suffering losses in 1861, buying more locally rather than importing, a
sure sign of straitened circumstances. Subsequent losses in the Labrador cod and seal
fisheries meant their “exchange” was not readily taken and, although they were able
to buy locally, the Dun reporter declared they were not fit for credit abroad.59
Not surprisingly, those better able to withstand a poor fishery were long-
established firms with widespread operations and a history of success in their varied
interests, often having branch houses in another part of the island or in Britain,
although even having the security of a parent house could not guarantee immunity to
failure. The father and son merchant firm of Mudge & Co. was “an old established
English house” with considerable means in real estate and shipping and extensive
trade in Britain. In 1855 they enjoyed an A No.1 credit rating, but by 1865 the firm
had failed. Mudge, Sr. was described as an “old man, blind and decrepit” and his son
as having gone off to Montreal.60 Still, most of the city’s largest firms were able to
weather the poor fisheries and the failures of their debtors. Although they had endured
heavy losses in 1861, it was reported that Bowring Brothers “never g[a]ve notes” and
had “good credit for all engagements”, no doubt due to their extensive business
interests in the retail and wholesale trades, insurance, shipping, shares in a gas
company and directorships in the local bank.61 What distinguished the Bowrings from
speculators such as C.F. Bennett or visionaries such as James Rogerson, was the
length of time they had been active in these diverse trades and their long record of
success.
Perhaps due to the particularly precarious nature of social climbing in the St.
John’s business community, self-made men were especially admired for having met
the challenges provided by Newfoundland’s economic climate. The Dun reports are
56 Of the 257 businesses rated in the Newfoundland credit ledger from 1855 to 1874, there were 45
outright failures. This does not include the many firms reported as having failed prior to 1855 and
having started again, or those forced to seek time from or compromises with creditors.
57 R.G. Dun, p. 20.
58 R.G. Dun, p. 52.
59 R.G. Dun, p. 50. The Dun reporter regularly noted when a business began buying goods locally or if
a store appeared to be carrying less stock, thus interpreting both moves as indicative of financial
difficulties and cause for caution in dealing with the firms in question.
60 R.G. Dun, p. 20.
61 R.G. Dun, p. 25.
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full of businessmen who started out as clerks in a local establishment to one day
become a partner in that same firm or to start their own businesses. This was perhaps
the easiest, and definitely the most common, way of moving through the ranks of the
business class. L. O’Brien was already an old man who had been many years in
business with much wealth and valuable real estate and shipping when first reported
in the Dun ledger in 1855. But the fact that he had at one time been a “common
laborer” was still considered significant enough to mention in 1861. One rarely gained
in wealth and social standing without suffering regular setbacks, however, and the
process of upward social mobility was often a long and arduous one as was the case
with Boyd & McDougall, merchants who had “no means when they com[mence]d
hav[ing] worked their way up”, James Cox, a tailor, who was said to have “made
himself”, and J. &W. Boyd, brothers involved in the lumber industry, who had “made
all they [we]re worth”.62 Being a longtime and respected resident of the city and
having made money was not always sufficient to escape one’s origins. Although John
Kelly was a “very wealthy man”, he was still described by the Dun reporter as “only
a butcher.”63
Another way of ensuring social advancement, as well as a good credit rating, was
to marry well, as did James Kent, a merchant who married the daughter of the
aforementioned John Kelly. Kent later went into business with his brother Robert,
who had also “married some money”.64 They were not alone. David Slater was
reported as having “married Job’s daughter”, Job Brothers & Co. being described as
an English firm worth upwards of £200,000.65 Robert Prowse, Jr., of Robert Prowse
& Sons, married the daughter of Kenneth McLea, then said to be one of the best
businessmen in the city. McLea’s report stated that, upon his death, he had left money
to his daughter, although the report on Prowse suggested the money was left to him.66
Either way, Prowse, like the others, had benefited from his marriage into a family of
wealth, whether financially or simply by association.
These reports suggest another advantage to marrying well: not only did one gain
social connections but a wealthy father-in-law helped project the image of a secure
business and the promise of ready capital should the need arise. Usually the
implication was warranted, as the credit ledger mentions several businesses benefiting
from an injection of capital courtesy of a wealthy father- or brother-in-law.67
Consequently, women, both directly and indirectly, played an important role in the
development of the St. John’s business community as the suppliers of capital, whether
it came from their families or from themselves. This role was not restricted only to the
wives of businessmen, for after the failure and dissolution of the mercantile firm
Thomas & Dickenson, Henry Dickenson was fortunate to have “charge of some
£3000 belonging to his sister-in-law, Mrs. Francis, a widow”. Having “no means of
his own”, it would appear he used Mrs. Francis’s money to start himself in business
62 R.G. Dun, pp. 32, 33, 63.
63 R.G. Dun, p. 47.
64 R.G. Dun, p. 22
65 R.G. Dun, pp. 35, 56.
66 R.G. Dun, pp. 26, 54.
67 R.G. Dun, pp. 26, 73, 79.
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again.68 Clearly, wives, mothers, sisters and aunts played a crucial role as investors in
the businesses of their male relations, but they were never considered partners in the
family firms they helped support. The ideology of separate spheres and the pattern of
inheritance among the middle class supported this passive role for women in business.
Only single or widowed women could take on an active, independent role in business,
for it was apparent that they had not chosen to abrogate their domestic roles as wives
and mothers but were doing so out of necessity and in the absence of male support.
Furthermore, while sons tended to inherit interests in their father’s business, daughters
generally received an income in trust.69 Such was the case upon the death of St. John’s
merchant Kenneth McLea, his estate being divided equally among his three sons and
three daughters — the sons’ interests in the business, the daughters’ to be paid out in
four years with interest.70
At the same time, women were not simply passive participants in the business lives
of their fathers, husbands and sons. Some women worked in their husbands’ shops,
ran millinery shops within their husbands’ dry goods stores or, upon a husband’s
death, ran the business until their sons were of an age to take on the responsibility.71
The Newfoundland credit ledger also mentions a few women who ran their own
businesses, but these were invariably spinsters or widows in an acceptable trade such
as millinery or crockery or running a boarding house, as in the case of M.A.
Whiteford, Sarah Bolt and Mrs. Mullowney, respectively.72 These were acceptable
occupations for a woman, it has been noted, because “Servicing lodgers [was] an
extension of women’s caring functions . . . carried out on a larger scale” while
“Millinery and dressmaking, catering to an all-female clientele, were the main
exceptions to male dominance of the higher reaches of retailing”.73
The situation was quite different for married women, for under English law a
married woman could not legally sign a business contract due to the “unity of the
person” principle whereby upon marriage a man and woman became one person
represented by the husband.74 Accordingly, there were more restrictions on the
business activities of married women. Upon marrying in middle age, Whiteford, who
had successfully run her own millinery shop for several years, gave up her
independent business to join her husband, a Mr. Reynolds, in helping him establish a
firm, Reynolds & Co. Whiteford was presumed to be the Co., continuing her millinery
business within that firm. When Reynolds died only a few years after their marriage,
leaving his wife little even though it had been her means which had “started him”,
68 R.G. Dun, pp. 31, 78.
69 Davidoff and Hall have argued that the practice “had been created to preserve landed property intact
while ensuring protection for daughters after marriage” with “the subsidiary advantage of keeping
part of the family assets safe from creditors”: Davidoff and Hall, Family Fortunes, pp. 209, 272.
70 R.G. Dun, p. 54.
71 R.G. Dun, pp. 32, 47, 49.
72 R.G. Dun, pp. 37, 43, 70.
73 Davidoff and Hall, Family Fortunes, pp. 299, 302.
74 Linda Kealey, ed., Pursuing Equality: Historical Perspectives on Women in Newfoundland and
Labrador (St. John’s, 1993), p. 135. A married woman “could not sign Bills of Exchange, make
contracts, sue or be sued, collect debts or stand surety and therefore she could not act as a partner,
since for all practical purposes, on marriage a woman died a kind of civil death”: Davidoff and Hall,
Family Fortunes, p. 200.
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Whiteford continued to run the business under his name.75 Clearly, it was acceptable
for a wife to help her husband in business or for an unmarried or widowed woman to
operate on her own. But there are no married women mentioned in the Dun records
who ran their own businesses independent of their husbands, nor are there any single
women involved in non-traditional trades. These restrictions on a woman’s ability to
participate in the business world reflected both the realities of women’s legal status in
the period as well as the dominant ideology of separate spheres which dictated a
woman’s domestic role and limited her participation in the world of business.
Otherwise, there is little to differentiate businesswomen from businessmen in the
records. On the whole, men owned larger companies, had more real estate and were
wealthier. But in terms of their characterization, similar words appear in reports on
both sexes. Whiteford was described as respectable and trustworthy, Bolt as active,
persevering, prudent, of good business capacity and very straightforward, and
Mullowney as industrious, decent and smart.76 It would appear that women, despite
the disadvantages of their sex, were accepted as being quite capable of running a
successful, creditworthy business by both Dun reporters and the St. John’s business
community. In fact, these women were more positively viewed than many
businessmen.77
Although women were generally mentioned as assets in establishing their
husbands’ credit ratings, wives and families could sometimes be seen negatively.
Such was the case with Mabbins, a former clerk in the commission and auction
business of William H. Mare. By 1861, Mabbins had become a partner in the firm but
in 1863, the company was “dissolved in consequence of Mabbins marrying beneath
him [and] becoming neglectful of bus[iness]”. It was further reported that Mare had
“paid him handsomely to get rid of him” and that Mabbins had subsequently gone to
New Zealand.78 Others found their businesses suffering not from having married
poorly, but from having large and expensive families who were a drain on the purse.
Such was the case with J.C. Tousiant, a St. John’s hotel owner who failed and had to
move his business and family to Harbour Grace. It was also the case with Dr. Dow, a
medical doctor in Harbour Grace who was considered to be doing a good practice but
who “live[d] too well to save money” and whose “family expenses [we]re heavy”.79
Theodore Clift, a commission merchant in St. John’s, was said to be a safe man with
fair credit and “hold[ing] his own”, but he, too, bore the burden of a large family and
“therefore [was] not saving money”.80
Surprisingly, ethnicity and religion, like sex, do not appear to have played a
75 R.G. Dun, pp. 37, 70, 72.
76 R.G. Dun, pp. 37, 43, 70, 72.
77 This is not to suggest that single and widowed women in business operated on a level playing field
with businessmen in their community. According to Davidoff and Hall, “women were regarded as
poor credit risks given their legal disabilities, dependence on male intervention and good will, and the
short-term nature of their business ventures. . . . Banks remained wary of lending to women. . . . This
general lack of commercial credibility was an important factor in the limited scale of women’s
business operations”: Davidoff and Hall, Family Fortunes, p. 278.
78 R.G. Dun, p. 74.
79 R.G. Dun, pp. 33, 53.
80 R.G. Dun, p. 29.
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significant role in determining one’s creditworthiness. In a country infamous for its
historical religious and ethnic divisions, little attention was given to either.
Infrequently in the reports, a person was described as an Irishman, Scotchman or
Frenchman but little was made of their ethnic origins and very rarely was a reference
made to religious affiliation. Although Andrew Drysdale and Alexander Stuart, both
merchants, were described as “close” Scots and J. and W. Boyd as “shrewd
Scotchmen”, it is not clear whether being “close” or “shrewd” and being Scottish are
linked.81 It is suggested that a few Irishmen, such as liquor retailer John Eagan, were
drinkers, but again a clear connection is not made and it is just as likely that Eagan’s
habit is simply seen as an occupational hazard.82 In either case, all else being equal in
terms of means, capacity and social standing, ethnicity did not appreciably affect how
one was reported or rated. Yet, ethnicity may have influenced how one behaved, for
it would appear that businessmen may have chosen to associate with others of similar
origins and many maintained contacts with firms in the Old Country or were known
to have friends of the same ethnicity. Druggist J.J. Dearin was described as “Precentor
at Free Kirk of Scotland here and has many Scotch friends”, while Richard O’Dwyer,
a merchant, was said to be well-connected in Ireland.83
As evidenced by the comparisons made between the Newfoundland credit ledger
and Katz’s study of the Hamilton business community, there are many similarities in
the Dun credit ledgers which are no doubt attributable to the company’s instructions
to its correspondents regarding the information to be acquired on local firms. They
also reflect the shared attitudes of 19th-century businessmen throughout much of
North America and Western Europe. Yet, it is the variation between them which
allows us to gain special insight into a particular business community. While there are
many commonalities shared by the business communities of Hamilton and St. John’s,
there are also significant differences.
For example, the ledger reports are similar with regard to the incidence of
downward social mobility among businessmen and the sheer uncertainty of economic
success. Katz argued that this was accompanied by “aggressive, anxious and
competitive behavior” on the part of Hamilton’s business class as revealed by the
litigiousness of its members,84 yet there is little evidence that economic uncertainty
contributed to similar behaviour in the St. John’s business community. Reports of
court action are extremely rare in the Newfoundland credit ledger and the few lawsuits
mentioned were usually instigated by foreign firms against local businessmen.
Furthermore, there is only one incident reported of a St. John’s firm considered to
have “dealt unfairly” with a client. The Dun reporter charged that Bowring Brothers
81 R.G. Dun, pp. 51, 63, 73.
82 R.G. Dun, p. 40.
83 R.G. Dun, pp. 18, 28. Historian Gerald Tulchinsky discussed similar findings in an article using the
Dun records to explore Montreal’s Jewish business community. While there was much evidence of
anti-Semitism in the Dun credit ledger for Montreal, particularly with regard to the alleged dubious
honesty of Jewish businessmen, Tulchinsky found that it had little impact on a businessman’s credit
rating. See Gerald Tulchinsky, “‘Said to be a very honest Jew’: The R.G. Dun Credit Reports and
Jewish Business Activity”, Urban History Review, 18, 3 (1990), pp. 200-9.
84 Katz, “The Entrepreneurial Class”, p. 22, and Katz, Doucet and Stern, Early Industrial Capitalism,
p. 25.
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had called in the debts of Brown & Co., forcing them into an assignment although the
firm had “plenty to pay” its liabilities.85 Much more numerous are the reports of firms
requesting and being granted time or of creditors accepting compromises and of
businesses receiving support from family or other local firms. Reasons for the
apparent difference are not clear. While the personal and financial ties linking
members of the St. John’s business community might explain its relatively congenial
record of relations in the face of economic difficulties, Katz also emphasized the
kinship ties and financial interdependence characterizing Hamilton’s business
community.86 Clearly, further examination of the Dun records and additional research
on the nature of business relations in mid-19th-century Newfoundland are necessary
before such issues can be resolved, but the comparison does suggest avenues for
future investigation.
This research note has attempted to call attention to the multiple uses of the R.G.
Dun & Co. credit ledgers through an illustration of what the records can tell us about
the business community in mid-19th-century St. John’s. Reports contained in the
Newfoundland credit ledger include few surprises: Newfoundland’s economy, and
therefore its businessmen and women, relied heavily on the fishery, leaving them
vulnerable to the consequences of low prices or a poor catch; social mobility could be
as often downward as upward in direction; and the kinship ties and interdependence
of members of the community were as prevalent as they were significant in
determining how business was transacted. But the records can also make contributions
to Newfoundland historiography in pointing to the important role played by women
in business in supplying linkages and capital, the impact of 19th-century middle-class
attitudes regarding morality, the family and gender roles on everything from credit to
inheritance, and the relative unimportance of ethnicity and religion in granting credit.
Finally, the R.G. Dun & Co. Collection can contribute much to comparative studies
by allowing scholars to compare the credit ledgers for different business communities,
further contributing to our understanding of the development of various patterns of
doing business at the middle of the 19th century.
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